* Test was scheduled after break-in by nun, peace activists
* WSI, unit of G4S, distributed material as 'training aide'
* Firm has since been fired from its contract
WASHINGTON, Oct 31 (Reuters) - Guards at the U.S.
government's maximum-security facility for weapons-grade uranium
were given a copy of a test and its answers before they were to
take it, an official report by the Energy Department's Inspector
General said on Wednesday.
The test was prompted by a major security breach at the
government's Y-12 nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee in
July, when an 82-year-old nun and two aging peace activists
broke into the complex and vandalized it.
The building, designed after the Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda
attacks on New York and Washington, was supposed to be one of
the most secure complexes in the United States.
The recent break-in led to a series of detailed reviews of
the Energy Department's oversight of its nuclear weapons
facilities.
A federal inspector from the Energy Department's Office of
Health, Safety and Security was at the site on Aug. 29, the day
before the test was to be given. He found a copy of the test and
answer key, in the car of the security guard who was his escort,
the report said.
The compromised test was pulled, and a revised version was
given.
An investigation found the test's questions and answers had
been widely distributed as a "training aide" for guards by WSI
Oak Ridge, owned by international security firm G4S.
G4S was the focus of a political and media storm this summer
after it failed to provide enough guards for the London
Olympics, forcing the British government to mobilize thousands
of troops at the last minute to help with security.
WSI officials said there was "no intent to cheat" on the
test, Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote in his report,
terming the credibility of their testimony "questionable."
The firm was fired from Y-12 on Oct 1, and the security
work was taken over by contractor B&W Y-12, a unit of Babcock &
Wilcox Co, which operates the site for the Energy
Department.
The test had been shared with B&W to get comments on its
accuracy, but Friedman said federal officials did not give
detailed instructions on keeping the information secure.
A spokeswoman for B&W Y-12 was not immediately available for
comment.
"Based on disclosures by contractor officials, there is also
a possibility that compromises of test materials may have
occurred at other sites without discovery," Friedman wrote.
'TROUBLING DISPLAYS OF INEPTITUDE'
In an earlier report, Friedman had excoriated the department
for "troubling displays of ineptitude" at the plant, where among
other missteps a broken security camera was left unfixed for
about six months.
His review of the incident in July found guards ignored
motion sensors tripped by the peace activists because they were
routinely triggered by wildlife.
"Security of the nation's most sensitive nuclear material
storage and processing facilities must not be left to chance,"
he said.
The Energy Department's Office of Health, Safety and
Security said it has tightened its test procedures as a result.
But the head of the Nuclear National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the agency in the department responsible
for the sites, disagreed that problems with its oversight of
contractors played a role in the compromised test.
In an official response, Thomas D'Agostino said the issue
was due to "the unilateral decision on the part of the
contractor to make further internal dissemination to a broader
number of individuals."
The NNSA has said it fixed the immediate security issues. A
task force is currently assessing its oversight of the nuclear
weapons complex.
