Brexicon: A full dictionary of Brexit-related jargon

We’ve tried not to be too dry, though necessarily having to reflect some of the arid prose of both London and Brussels’ bureaucracies. We’ve also tried to be unbiased, and to be objective as possible (as in “as frictionless as possible” as ministers often say) but the task is made more difficult because so many feel so emotional about the issue, the facts themselves are often in dispute, and trying to nail any of these definitions is like trying to nail European Commission approved jelly to a European Commission approved wall. This guide does not, as Boris Johnson would say, possess the lapidary status of the codes of Hammurabi or Moses, and makes no claim to do so.

It’s continuing project, and we will add to it as comprehensively as possible (there we go again), and hope you find it useful. We’re also very interested in any new coinages you come across, so please share them via letters@independent.co.uk

Article 49: The clause in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that sets out the procedure for an eligible state to apply for membership of the European Union. Theoretically, it could in due course be used by the UK to rejoin the EU. One day.

Article 50: The clause in Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that sets out the procedure for a member state to leave the European Union. It was composed by senior British diplomat Sir John (now Lord) Kerr. He has said that it is reversible during the notice period; others differ. The clause reads, in full:

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

Brexchosis: Double portmanteau word invented by the fecund mind of Boris Johnson. In a speech by the Foreign Secretary about the “road to Brexit” on 13 February 2018 he said: “We love to run ourselves down – in fact we are Olympic gold medal winners in the sport of national self-deprecation.

“And in the current bout of Brexchosis we are missing the truth: that it is our collective national job now to ensure that when the history books come to be written Brexit will be seen as just the latest way in which the British bucked the trend, and took the initiative – and did something that responds to the real needs and opportunities that we face in the world today and had the courage to break free from an idea – however noble its origins – that had become outdated, at least for us.”

Brexit: Portmanteau expression for British exit from the European Union, ironically devised by a pro-European. According to the Oxford English Dictionary it dates back to 15 May 2012, when the OED awarded this honour to Peter Wilding, founder and director of the British Influence think tank, which campaigned for the UK to Remain in the EU in the 2016 referendum, put it in a tweet – “Unless a clear view is pushed that Britain must lead in Europe at the very least to achieve the completion of the single market then the portmanteau for Greek euro exit might be followed by another sad word, Brexit”.

Brexit, clean: Preferred expression/euphemism for hard Brexit favoured by Leavers. Also the title of a book by pro-Brexit economists Liam Halligan and Gerard Lyons.

Brexit Day: The UK is scheduled to leave the EU on Friday, 29 March 2019 (at 11 pm, according to the Prime Minister). If the transition period proposed by the EU is adopted, then the UK will leave the transitional status on 31 December 2020. The final result of the EU referendum was announced on Friday 24 June 2016 at 7.20am by the Electoral Commission chairwoman Jenny Watson at Manchester Town Hall. The then Ukip leader, Nigel Farage, called for 23 June, the referendum polling day, to be declared UK Independence Day.

Brexit, hard: Definitions vary, but converge on the idea that the UK leaves the EU and goes on to trade with it under World Trade Organisation rules, or an agreement based on WTO rules, but also leaving the EU’s customs union and single market. See also Brexit, cliff edge and Brexit, clean.

Brexit means Brexit: Catchphrase Theresa May first uttered when she was Home Secretary and campaigning to become her party leader. In her one and only campaign event before all the other candidates dropped out, at a rally of supporters in Birmingham on 11 July 2016, she stated: “Well, I couldn’t be clearer. Brexit means Brexit. And we’re going to make a success of it. There will be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it by the back door, and no second referendum. The country voted to leave the European Union, and as Prime Minister I will make sure that we leave the European Union.” Two days later she was appointed Prime Minister.

Brexit, red, white and blue: Theresa May’s short-lived refutation of any other “colour” of Brexit. She told reporters during a trip to the Gulf in December 2016: “I’m interested in all these terms that have been identified – hard Brexit, soft Brexit, black Brexit, white Brexit, grey Brexit – and actually what we should be looking for is a red, white and blue Brexit”.

Brexit, soft: Version of leaving the European Union that would mean staying in the EU customs union and/or single market, preferably with a very long or indefinite transition period. See also Brino and Brexit, white.

Brexit, white: A version of Brexit that retains UK membership of the EU customs union and/or single market. See also soft Brexit and Brino.

Brexodus: While more EU citizens come to the UK than the number who leave it, they are now coming in smaller numbers. The ONS found that 52,000 more UK citizens left than came back in the year ending September 2017.

Brino: “Brexit in name only”. Coinage devised by Jacob Rees-Mogg, chair of the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. In an interview in January 2018 he declared: “If everything is delayed for two years and then there’s high alignment you will find that by 2022 no one will have noticed any difference from having left. Then what will be the point of voting for the party that’s implemented it. I’m against ‘Brino’.”

Cliff edge: A version of hard Brexit which envisages no “transition” or “implementation” period. Feared by Remainers; embraced by some Leavers. See also clean Brexit.

Customs union, “a”: An arrangement whereby the UK can enjoy the benefits of the EU customs union but without full membership of it, theoretically allowing the UK to agree trade deals with other countries. The main precedent is Turkey, which is in a partial customs union with the EU for certain economic sectors – but excludes agriculture, for example. However, Turkey’s ability to conduct separate trade deals with other countries and to set its own terms for trade (tariffs, quotas and rules) are constrained by its partial customs union with the EU. UK membership of “a” customs union with the EU is official Labour Party policy, and favoured by some in the Conservative Party. Three European “micro-states”, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco, are also members of the EU customs union but not full member states of the EU. They operate under onerous conditions in terms of their ability to import goods that then enter the EU proper.

Customs union, “the”: The European Union’s founding principle, set in the Treaty of Rome, 1957, is that it would abolish all tariffs and quotas on trade within its members states, and that therefore all goods can circulate freely within the European Union. The member states would also agree to set a common external tariff and rules on imports for the rest of the world. Thus they set a tax on imports of American cars, and banned American GM food. The forerunner to the EU customs union was the smaller one set up by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg by Treaty in 1944.

Customs partnership with the EU: The UK’s policy, as set out in the 2016 position paper. Defined as follows by David Davis: “Aligning our approach to the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-EU customs border. One potential approach would involve the UK mirroring the EU’s requirements for imports from the rest of the world where their final destination is the EU. This is of course unprecedented as an approach and could be challenging to implement and we will look to explore the principles of this with business and the EU.”

Four freedoms, the: The free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the EU were first set out in the Rome. They were extended and made more practical under the single market, also known as the internal market, mostly completed in 1992. The four freedoms were further strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. According to the EU itself: “Originally, free movement of goods was seen as part of a customs union between the member states, involving the abolition of customs duties, quantitative restrictions on trade and equivalent measures, and the establishment of a common external tariff for the Community. Later, the emphasis was laid on eliminating all remaining obstacles to free movement of goods with a view to creating the internal market – an area without internal borders, in which goods could move as freely as on a national market.”

Free trade agreement: An EU-UK free trade agreement is UK government policy and is feasible. It would mean a free trade area across the existing EU28 (and any new members), whereby there would be no tariffs or taxes or quotas on goods or services from one country entering another. The problem is that it is not the same as a single market or customs union, and would require some form of border checks or controls or other arrangements. This is because it could be very easy for, say, China to export steel to the UK and then for that steel to bypass EU tariffs by freely going straight into the rest of the EU. Therefore trade would be subject to “friction” and cost, and would mean, possibly, some form of hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, as well as at the airports, Channel ports and other doorways. See also streamlined customs arrangement.

Negotiations typically cover goods rather than services, and take many years to conclude, as with the recent deals between the EU and Canada. On the other hand the UK starts from a position of high integration and free trade rather than with barriers in place. The EU has expressed its dissatisfaction with a free trade deal encompassing three of the four freedoms, excluding the right of labour to move around the area.

Frictionless trade: In absolute terms this would be the status quo between the UK and the rest of the EU, within the single Market and the customs union (though membership of the eurozone and the Schengen Agreement would make trade be even easier). Not literally true because some national rules and customs rules and duties still inhibit trade, as do the existence of different currencies in the UK, Sweden and Poland, for example. The US, therefore, is a more frictionless single market than the EU, notwithstanding the different rules of the 50 states. “Trade as frictionless as possible” is the formulation used by British minsters to mean the lowest level of customs controls, tariffs, quotas and restrictions as can be negotiated. These could still be significant, and cannot be more friction-free than the current arrangement.

Hard Brexit: See Brexit, hard.

Internal market: See single market.

Legal entity: The EU exists as an international legal entity in its own right. This is the legal underpinning to the EU negotiating with the UK on Brexit as a bloc rather than through individual states. The conferral of legal personality on the EU means that it has the ability to:

Conclude and negotiate international agreements in accordance with its external commitments;

Become a member of international organisations;

Join international conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.

Member states: Formal description of the countries that form the EU. The original “Six” of 1957 have been joined by 22 more. Since 1 July 2013, when Croatia joined the EU, the European Union counts 28 Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (until Brexit).

All member states are in the single market; but some non-EU states are as well (eg Norway), or partially in the single market (Switzerland).

All member states are in the customs union; but some non-EU states are partially as well (eg Turkey).

Not all member states are in the border, visa and passport-free Schengen Area: the UK and Ireland and Cyprus are not. And one non-EU state is in the Schengen Area – Switzerland.

Some EU states are members of the eurozone, others have agreed to join and others have opt-outs.

Opt-outs: Negotiated by individual states as a way of protecting vital national interests when further integration is proposed. They are examples of how individual nations can be allowed to opt out of obligations they find irksome; but are also difficult and sometimes costly to secure, and are not retrospective, as with some Eastern European countries who wish to restrict freedom of movement of people. The most celebrated in the UK is the exemption of sterling form the eurozone, but there are other exemptions below:

Schengen Agreement: Ireland and the United Kingdom;

Economic and monetary union (the euro): Denmark and the United Kingdom;

Defence: Denmark;

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Poland and the United Kingdom;

Security and justice: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (the latter two countries may opt into given initiatives if they wish).

Thus there are some areas where Brexit will mean no difference to the UK’s relations with the EU27. John Major’s government negotiated a UK opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, subsequently irrevocably reversed by the Blair government in 1997. David Cameron’s attempted renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership in 2015 to 216 could be seen as a failed bid to widen the UK’s right to win opt-outs; and Brexit as an even more ambitious attempt to “cherrypick” EU rights and obligations.

Qualified majority voting (QMV): In effect the loss of the historic right of the UK and other member states to veto EU Commission proposals they don’t like. This was begun in the 1980s and has been extended to a number of important areas, thus diminishing national sovereignty and the power of national parliaments to block new laws. However the veto and unanimity still prevail in some crucial votes.

The QMV rules have become steadily more complicated, with more and more member states and the need to balance the rights of large powers (eg Germany, population 83 million) and smaller countries (eg Malta, population 437,000, the same as Cardiff). According to the EU: Qualified majority (QM) is the number of votes required in the Council for a decision to be adopted when issues are being debated on the basis of Article 16 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 238 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council acts by QM, in co-decision with the Parliament.

On 1 November 2014, a new procedure for QM voting, the “double majority” rule, was introduced. Here, when the Council votes on a proposal by the Commission or the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a QM is reached if two conditions are met:

• 55 per cent of EU countries vote in favour – ie 16 out of 28;

• The proposal is supported by countries representing at least 65 per cent of the total EU population.

When the Council votes on a proposal not made by the Commission or the High Representative, a decision is adopted if:

• There are 72 per cent of EU country votes in favour; and

• They represent at least 65 per cent of the EU population.

QMV may be seen as a crude form of federal voting in the multi-state EU.

Regulatory alignment: Commonly taken to mean retention of many of the common rules and mutually agreed regulations that currently exist across the EU, including the UK, which would be “copy and pasted” after Brexit. The greater the degree of regulatory alignment the more likely it is that the UK would qualify to be a member of the single market in certain areas.

Regulatory equivalence: Where the UK decides to adopt rules and regulations which are different in their detail or wording to their EU counterparts, but which have much the same effect in practice. The greater the degree of regulatory equivalence, the more likely it is that the UK would qualify to be member of the single market in certain areas.

Regulatory divergence: Where the UK decides to enact its own rules and regulations on everything from workers’ rights and taxation to animal welfare and safety standards for cars. Parliament may or may not choose to follow EU practice, or amend it with a view to national needs and/or the requirements of trade agreements with other countries.

Regrexit: Regretting the decision to vote for Brexit. First used the day after the 2016 referendum.

Schengen Area: An agreement signed between some (not all) EU member states and some non-EU states to set up a “common travel area”, whereby all visas, border crossing controls and passport checks were abolished. Named after a small village in Luxembourg and inaugurated in 1985, with many countries joining since then. As a travel and transit arrangement it does not denote the right to settle or work or claim benefits, and is not the same as the freedom of movement of labour (or goods and services).

Single market: Now the usual expression for the former Common Market and internal market. A British idea embodied in the 1986 Single European Act and implemented across the EU in the “1992 Project”, mostly completed in that year and consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty. It aimed to make real the 1957 Treaty of Rome ambition of enshrining the “four freedoms”, which were not fully in place by the 1980s.

It extended the EU’s Common Market in goods and services and free movement of labour by abolishing non-formal and non-tariff restrictions. This meant, for example, that a Greek dentist’s qualifications would be recognised in, say, Ireland, and that national rules in areas such as food safety or the capital adequacy and regulation of banks, for example, would be mutually respected or harmonised across the EU. All EU member states must be members of the single market, and agree to rulings made on it by the European Union Court of Justice, but some countries have chosen to join the single market and abide by the rules set by the EU and the EU Commission, but not be full members of the EU and therefore without any formal say in the formulation of EU rules and laws on the single market.

Thus, Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland are members of the EU single market but not members of the EU; so-called “rule takers not rule makers” or “vassal states”. Together with the EU’s member states they comprise the European Economic Area, wider than the European Union itself. It is not essential to be a member of the EU customs union to join the single market, and Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland can therefore enter into trade agreements with other countries without formal reference to the EU.

Single market, access to: Commonly agreed by everyone, but subject to very different interpretations. (1) All countries have “access” to the EU single market if they are not covered by EU sanctions or a self-imposed exclusion (eg North Korea). (2) Some countries have arranged for partial access to the single market in certain economic sectors. Switzerland is the main example, where it has a series of bilateral agreements covering, among other things: free movement of people; air traffic; road traffic; agriculture; technical trade barriers; public procurement and science.

However these various agreements are subject to periodic revisions and negotiations to take into account changes in EU law, and are regarded by the EU Commission as irksome, and not necessarily a favoured model for the UK in future. Some believe that could serve as a model for UK “access to” the EU single market. However, the EU-Swiss agreements do not cover financial services, where Swiss banks use London as their main entrée into the EU.

By contrast, Switzerland is also a member of the EU Schengen Agreement, which removes all passport controls on the movement of people from and to the European Union.

Soft Brexit: See Brexit, soft.

Streamlined customs arrangements: The favoured approach of the UK Government as set out in the 2016 policy position paper. It means: “leaving as few additional requirements on EU trade as possible. This would aim to: continue some of the existing arrangements between the UK and the EU; put in place new negotiated and potentially unilateral facilitations to reduce and remove barriers to trade; and implement technology-based solutions to make it easier to comply with customs procedures.

This approach involves utilising the UK’s existing tried and trusted third-country processes for UK-EU trade, building on EU and international precedents, and developing new innovative facilitations to deliver as frictionless a customs border as possible.”

Tariff-free access to the EU: See customs union, “a”

Unanimity: Commonly thought to have been abandoned entirely by the EU, and the UK’s veto with it in the extension of qualified majority voting. While much of the national power of veto was indeed ended by the introduction of the single market, by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and by the dilution caused by enlargement in the 2000s, unanimity in the Council of Ministers from each member state is still compulsory in certain areas, and the UK still retained its formal right to prevent further integration or harmonisation in certain areas, namely: taxation; social security or social protection; the accession of new countries to the EU; foreign and common defence policy; and operational police cooperation between EU countries.

Veto: See unanimity

Withdrawal clause: See Article 50.