Last night’s vote showed that hard Brexit can be defeated if MPs come together

Fury almost drowned out jubilation in the House of Commons on Wednesday evening, after the Government was defeated on a crucial Brexit amendment by just four votes. The support of the Northern Ireland DUP was not enough to save the day. Theresa May was being punished for her failure to preserve, still less increase, her party’s inherited majority back in June in the cruellest possible way.

The few days of celebrating agreement with Brussels (and with her divided Cabinet) were over. May limps back to this week’s EU summit with her own authority and the fortunes of Brexit plunged back into doubt. Sacking Stephen Hammond, a Tory party vice-chairman who knew full well the likely cost of joining the rebels, was all she could do. MPs are now bound to vote on the final deal – assuming there is one – that David Davis and his team reach with Brussels. And if they have a vote, they can vote to reject it.

It all feels very dramatic. In many respects, though, the significance of Wednesday’s defeat is a lot less than it has been presented. First, because the fragility of the Prime Minister’s position is the norm and will remain so for the duration of this Parliament. The few days when she looked suddenly at ease – from the nocturnal helicopter dash to Brussels, to breakfast with Jean-Claude Juncker, to the cabinet meeting that approved the terms from London’s side – were the exception.

Second, because the agreements that were celebrated last week depended on diplomatic ambiguities that would not survive close scrutiny for very long. It is fair to say that almost any agreement involving the UK, Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic relies on language that permits different interpretations by each side – the Good Friday Agreement being a prime example. But the language that had been devised to allow the preservation of a non-border border between Northern Ireland and the Republic positively demanded that the Brexit supporters in particular turned a blind eye. The pretence was never going to last for long.

Third, because the arrangements mooted for Northern Ireland were bound eventually to incur the wrath of Brexiteers in quite distinct ways. The glorious phrase “regulatory alignment” (who dreamt that one up?) conjured up an intention to stay in the single market by other means – advantage Remainers and soft Brexiteers. The likely reality, though, is a lot, lot worse – for soft and hard Brexiteers alike. It is – if anything like those arrangements find their way into an ultimate deal – that the UK will commit to abiding by almost all EU regulations, without having a voice in their formulation.

There is evidence that quite a lot of business, including big business, would indeed favour “full regulatory alignment” for the whole of the UK, as the closest to the single market that is likely to be attained. In plumping for this option, however, the UK would be sacrificing one of the chief Brexiteer ambitions: the market advantage the UK could supposedly gain by not being subject to EU regulation. For all the bonhomie around the cabinet table this week, this argument is nothing like over yet.

So the “deal” hammered out between London and Brussels was nothing like as definitive as it was cracked up to be. Its main merit was to allow the talks to progress, with no guarantee that they would not subsequently fall apart. For the same reason, Theresa May’s respite was always likely to be fleeting.

Nor was the Government’s defeat in the Commons as decisive in substance as many Remainers perhaps thought. As was clarified when this particular amendment was tabled, a vote to reject the deal would not mean that Brexit itself had been rejected, or that there would be a second referendum. It would simply force a no-deal Brexit, or perhaps (Brussels willing) a return to negotiations.

If the vote on Wednesday evening was not significant in substance, however, its symbolic significance was enormous, as could be its longer-term consequences.

It demonstrated, first, that for all the efforts made to bring the DUP into government and for all the strong-arming over the past week by Conservative Party whips, Theresa May’s Government can be defeated, if Labour, Lib Dems and Tory rebels combine. That could encourage further rebellions, as well as fostering even keener debate.

It also showed, more specifically, that May does not command a majority for a hard Brexit. When Parliament reassembled after the referendum, MPs of all parties might have rushed to insist that they bowed to the “will of the people” accepting that a plebiscite takes precedence over the will of MPs. But the referendum’s 52-48 majority for Brexit has now, it would appear, been interpreted as a mandate for something rather less than a hard Brexit. The results of May’s ill-conceived “snap” general election pointed in the same direction.

It would be premature to conclude, however, that the views of Parliament and people are coalescing around a soft Brexit – even if, as is entirely possible, the Government loses next week’s vote on setting a precise date for leaving the EU. This is because the majority of polls suggest that there has been almost no decline in support for Brexit, despite signs of falling living standards and negative economic forecasts. The Brexiteers stand by their desire to “take back control”, by ditching EU regulation and, above all, curbing immigration (“free movement”), and seem less amenable to compromise on a soft Brexit than erstwhile Remainers.

With the country as divided as it was 18 months ago, it is possible to construct a Machiavellian stratagem, according to which the Prime Minister is quietly rooting for a soft Brexit, or even no Brexit at all, and using divisions in the Commons to achieve that. The notion of a majority of MPs not just voting down a deal with Brussels, but then legislating, say, for a second referendum, is probably no more than a Remainer’s dream. More plausible – and potentially more significant in the long term, however – would be the evolution of this week’s cross-party alliance into a force that led to the realignment of British party politics. With both major parties split on the UK’s relations with Europe, such realignment is overdue.