My list of weapons Europe can give Ukraine now - before it’s too late

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

With Donald Trump returning to the U.S. presidency on Jan. 20, Europeans are asking what they can do to keep Ukraine armed if U.S. military aid were to be cut back.

At first glance, it might seem like not much; Europe has abdicated to the U.S. much of its security and industrial base since the end of the Cold War.

When I took a deeper look, however, I discovered that Europe can provide significant useful, albeit non-traditional, military aid even in this short time frame. But Ukraine cannot wait; Europe must act now.

Last May, I wrote about how much military materiel Ukraine needed and how much it would cost, reality-testing an analysis put out by the Estonian Ministry of Defense calling for member states to annually contribute 0.25% of GDP for four or more years.

My analysis calculated that without U.S. participation, an annual contribution of approximately 0.5% GDP by European NATO members would sufficiently support Ukraine’s annual munitions needs for a defensive stalemate. Double that or more would be needed to support military restoration of Ukrainian territory.

Here we are, six months later, and only a few European nations have reached that minimum level of support. Defence production has also not expanded sufficiently to supply Ukraine.

Ukraine crucially needs air defence, artillery, drones, and general equipment. The U.S. still has several billion dollars of support authorised. The best use of this would be to provide Ukraine with materiel European allies do not produce, namely air defence interceptors (PATRIOT, AIM-7, AIM-9. and AIM-120) and long-range strike missiles (ATACMS and GMLRS) with any remaining funds used for artillery.

Europe can begin meeting some air defence needs. Multiple non-US NATO countries produce 2.75”/70 mm rockets in relatively large volumes. These can be quickly converted to short-range air defence systems like VAMPIRE to protect critical infrastructure from Russian cruise missiles and drones.

Ukraine also has proven skilled at developing electronic warfare systems to counter drones, and Europe can quickly support that with cash transfers or production of subcomponents for assembly in Ukraine.

Europe’s domestic ballistic missile defence system is the SAMP/T which uses Aster missiles. While low now, annual output of these could be accelerated with further investment. Europe produces multiple types of short-range missile and gun-based air defences whose production could similarly be increased.

Taking from active inventories could partially cover production shortfalls. Although donating materiel from active inventories and war reserves is risky, increased domestic production combined with a more effective Ukrainian force assuages this risk.

Ukraine still desperately needs artillery, and Western production and international procurement is lagging. More investment is needed, and schedules must be kept. Commitments to the Ukraine Defence Contact Group and to the “Czech initiative” must be greater and deliveries timelier.

Given Europe’s lack of HIMAR-equivalent rocket artillery and ballistic missile production, the Czech initiative could be expanded to procure equivalent systems from global producers.

Europe can quickly help with tactical and strike drones by expanding support to the existing “drone coalition” To be clear, Ukraine needs millions of tactical drones, tens-of-thousands of strike drones — and, of course, permission to use them against any military or dual-use target such as airfields, depots, and refineries.

To produce drones rapidly and in necessary quantities, Europe’s best option lies in either building Ukrainian designs outright or producing critical subcomponents such as cameras, flight controllers, motors, explosives, improved targeting systems, and batteries.

This opens up production to many small European firms that, with governmental help and financing, can nimbly integrate into the Ukrainian defence industrial base.

Finally, Ukraine still needs basic military equipment. Trucks, armoured vehicles, small arms, ammunition, mortars, medical kits, and body armour, among others, are in short supply. With Russia’s use of chemical weapons, Ukrainian forces also need gas masks. All of these are produced in Europe and can be ramped up. This equipment saves lives, and in a war of attrition, people are the most valuable resource.

I will be blunt: this task will not be easy. Ukraine’s backers will need to support Kyiv with equipment transfers and financial investments that could easily reach 1% of GDP annually. Bending rules and regulations will be necessary to speed up production; Ukraine cannot wait.

While supporting Ukrainian victory has a strong moral rationale, the fall of Ukraine would cast doubt on European promises writ large.

If Putin’s Russia succeeds in capturing Ukraine, it will continue its efforts to annex and terrorise its neighbours and the 21st century will be defined by force. If Europe sacrifices to guarantee Ukrainian victory now, Putin’s Russia will be stopped and the 21st Century will be defined by adherence to law.

Europe, now is the time to choose.


Michael Bohnert is an engineer at RAND, a US-based research institute. His research focuses on defense technology, acquisition policy, and industrial base management.