Matthew d'Ancona: We must convince the EU that a good Brexit is best for both of us

Pause for a moment to acknowledge the sheer scale of it: the UK’s formal declaration of its intention to leave the European Union under Article 50 is that rarest of occasions: a truly historic moment.

As Sir Tim Barrow, Britain’s permanent representative in Brussels, hands the letter of notification to Donald Tusk, the European Council president, the dissolution of a relationship that has done much to define this country’s political, commercial and social identity for more than 40 years will begin.

To appreciate the magnitude of this simple act of delivery, consider Sir Edward Heath’s account in his memoirs of the Commons vote on October 28 1971 in favour of joining the European Community: “I had been conscious of a tremendous weight of responsibility as I stood at the despatch box. No Prime Minister in time of peace has ever asked the House to take such a positive and historic decision as I was asking it to do that night. The world was watching…”

The world is watching once again as Theresa May embarks on a very different journey, disentangling the UK from formal membership of the EU and — she hopes — forging a new relationship with Brussels that will both liberate and strengthen this country. Will the outcome be compared to the Suez crisis or the Falklands conflict? Will Brexit be seen as an augury of British decline or of renewed vigour?

Today’s transaction also marks the end of the long and speculative preamble that has dominated domestic politics since the referendum on June 23, and the launch of what amounts to a Brexit industry. The bombastic phoney war of slogans, claims and counter-claims, and political posturing will now be supplanted by a process of gritty, sprawling attrition, in which hundreds of negotiators will argue over the respective interests of the UK and the remaining 27 member states.

Like most divorces, this one will hinge on money and custody. As leader of the British contingent, Brexit Secretary David Davis must persuade Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief deal-broker, that the financial and trade negotiations should be conducted in parallel. Brussels wants €60 billion as an up-front settlement before a new commercial relationship is discussed.

It is all but certain that the UK will pay a price for its liberty, and — depending on its future relationship with the EU — ongoing subsidies after its formal secession. But the talks will go nowhere if this sum has to be agreed before anything else is discussed. Barnier’s initial task is to persuade his 27 clients — some of them still furious over Brexit — to be reasonable if they want a mutually-beneficial deal.

As for custody: it is not a promising start that the 3.3 million EU nationals living in the UK and the 900,000 (or more) British ex-pats in European countries have become bargaining chips. Their respective rights to remain where they are after Brexit should have been acknowledged before the talks began, as a sign of good faith and shared decency. The fact that no such agreement could be reached between the Prime Minister and her counterparts is a poor omen.

What is already clear is that she will be fighting a battle on two fronts — in Brussels and at home. However often ministers insist that there will be “no running commentary” on the talks, Parliament has the right and the responsibility to demand progress reports as it sees fit, and can be relied upon to do so.

Many Brexiteers will recoil at the taste of compromise, the essence of any negotiation but anathema to ideologues. Even as Britain withdraws from the single market it will seek maximum access to its benefits, especially in sectors that are essential to the UK economy. The consequence may be continued payments to the EU, recognition of the European Court of Justice and other EU agencies in specific circumstances, and new immigration rules that will not significantly reduce the number of newcomers to this country.

Referendums force voters to make binary decisions: Yes-No, In-Out. But geopolitical reality is inherently complex, its colours shaded and mingled. Even if the PM secures an advantageous deal, the soaring expectations raised by the rhetoric of the referendum campaign cannot possibly be met.

At the same time, she must confront the clear and present danger of the UK’s fragmentation even as it is detached from the EU. In this context, the Government’s recognition that Northern Ireland has the right under the Good Friday Agreement to seek unification with Eire — thus remaining part of the EU — will embolden those in Scotland who seek to leave the UK but not Europe.

No Prime Minister, especially a Conservative, wishes to preside over the dissolution of the Union. Yet, even as she barters with her fellow heads of government on the Continent, May will be looking over her shoulder and wondering whether the constitutional integrity of the UK will survive this tumultuous process.

Against stiff competition, her most formidable foe will be the clock. Under EU rules — untested, it should be noted — a member state seeking to leave must settle its terms of exit within two years. This is a deadline that would test the Usain Bolt of diplomats. But EU negotiations rarely, if ever, resemble sprints. A better analogy would be a Mexican stand-off in which all the participants wait until the last possible moment to commit themselves. If the Brexit negotiations follow this model, they are doomed.

The challenge for May and Davis is to persuade our soon-to-be-ex-partners that, however deep their resentment of the UK’s decision, the collapse of the talks would damage their interests, as well as ours. This need not be a zero-sum game. It is true that the PM’s place in history will be settled by these negotiations. But, as she well understands, the stakes are so much higher than that.