Putin just won another victory – yet the West still has its head in the sand
I’ll cut straight to the chase: Georgia, one of the fault-line post-Soviet states caught between the West and Russia, is on a fast-track to dictatorship and subjugation by Moscow.
The Putin-friendly Georgian Dream (GD) Party “triumphed” in this weekend’s parliamentary elections, with 53.93 per cent of the popular vote. It was a landslide marred by credible allegations of voter fraud – irregularities so pervasive that Georgia’s president, Salome Zourabichvili, has called them a “Russian special operation”. One global anti-corruption watchdog showcased rampant fraud in rural areas – in some neighbourhoods, groups of men were spotted voting in several precincts and the Georgian Dream’s vote tally soared from 50-60 per cent to 80-90 per cent. Transparency International Georgia produced more than 360 photographs and video recordings documenting electoral violation.
The GD’s post-election agenda is as nefarious as the tactics that it allegedly used to secure power. The GD’s billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili has vowed to ban opposition parties for unspecified “war crimes” against the Georgian people. Russia’s alleged interference on the GD’s behalf will further its pro-Kremlin drift. Ivanishvili said Georgia should apologise for provoking Russia into invading it in 2008 and supports “conservative values” that mirror Russia’s own.
As the GD transforms Georgia into an authoritarian client state of Russia, the West has – once again – looked like a helpless bystander. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken only issued a vague condemnation of “contraventions to international norms” on the day of the vote and did not initiate any punitive measures against the GD. The EU called for a probe into Georgia’s election “irregularities” while its rotating president Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – albeit acting on his own initiative – travelled to Tbilisi to congratulate the GD on its triumph.
This passivity is a tragic continuity in the West’s policy towards Georgia. When Russian forces invaded her in August 2008 and recognised the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, the US and EU did not sanction Russian officials. Instead, Europe rewarded the aggression with new energy deals and President Obama embarked on a campaign to reset US-Russia relations.
From the start of the GD’s takeover in October 2012, the destructive consequences of Ivanishvili’s pro-Russian orientation were apparent. Just two months after the GD’s parliamentary election victory, Russian and Georgian representatives congregated in Prague. Ivanishvili subsequently pushed for closer Russia-Georgia economic ties, which caused Russia to lift its embargo on Georgian wine in June 2013. As Tbilisi became more dependent on Moscow, Russia responded by stealthily expanding the borders of Georgia’s occupied territories. When it seized 10 hectares near the village of Bershueti in July 2017, the West’s sole response was to issue a vague declaration of concern.
The GD’s penchant for authoritarianism was also apparent within a year of it taking power. Although he officially resigned as Georgia’s Prime Minister in November 2013, Ivanishvili remained the power behind the throne as dozens of his former business allies staffed key Georgian ministries. Yet the West ignored this erosion of Georgian democracy even as it simultaneously cheered on the overthrow of Ukraine’s autocratic pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in November 2013.
Fundamentally, as the GD feigned interest in European integration, the West gave it the benefit of the doubt. After the GD passed its repressive foreign agents registration law in May, the EU waited nearly two months to halt its membership application and suspend 30 million euros of funding. On October 4, the EU warned that Georgia-EU relations would suffer, and that GD officials would be sanctioned if they tried to create a one-party state. Ivanishvili called the EU’s bluff and escalated his threats against the Georgian opposition with impunity. And so here we are today.
If the West does not take a unified stance against the GD’s human rights abuses, Georgia risks sliding more firmly into Russia’s clutches. With Belarus and Georgia in its orbit, an emboldened Moscow would strengthen anti-democratic actors in Moldova and use coercion to bully Armenia.
The West must set a redline against the GD’s abuse of power and Russia’s subversion of Georgian democracy. Not just for Georgia’s sake but in the interests of European security.
Dr Samuel Ramani is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute