The 'sliding doors' moments that have transformed Liverpool's midfield

The construction of a successful team is part design, part happy accident. Go through any title-winning squad, and you will find influential players who were not the first-choice transfer target before their signing, or were pursued with an element of hope or calculated risk before becoming fundamental to a side’s success.

Managers and scouts will never advertise that when their purchases thrive, of course. The game is awash with memoirs of the most successful recruiters giving the impression every great deal followed months, even years, of studious contemplation and pursuit, colourfully describing that first glimpse of a future superstar.

When a player signs and performs badly, many of the same scouts or their coaches will casually drop in the names of the preferred choices they really wanted, as if it makes them more blameless for the failures.

That was certainly the case at Liverpool during the 25 years before Jürgen Klopp’s arrival. One of the most welcome shifts in Anfield recruitment since 2015 is the fact we no longer hear prolonged laments about the targets they did not get.

There is an alternative reality at Anfield in which, rather than eulogise about the transformation under Klopp, we are ushered towards what might have been had interest in Leicester’s left-back Ben Chilwell or Roma’s Emerson (prior to his move to Chelsea) proved fruitful before the club took a deeper dive into the positive reports on Hull’s Andy Robertson.

How would the last three years have differed had Brazilian Alex Teixeira not preferred the cash of the Chinese Super League, or Julian Draxler chosen Anfield ahead of Paris St-Germain before Liverpool increased their interest in Mohamed Salah?

These 'what might have been' stories are exposed as irrelevant in a successful era - shrugged off as an occupational hazard. Klopp has always blanked out any disappointment about those who got away, sparing all his energy to enthusiastically welcome those who did not, even when they may not have been No 1 on the original target list.

The same applies to the setbacks of unwanted, unexpected departures.

Perhaps the greatest shift away from Anfield’s recent past came in January 2018, when the most influential player was sold and the wheels sped on rather than falling off. Instead of adding the sale of Philippe Coutinho to the heavy pile of Anfield excuses since 1990, Klopp reacted by elevating his Liverpool side.

There is no better example of this than the make-up of Liverpool’s midfield since Coutinho vacated it. In the summer of 2017-18, Barcelona’s pursuit of the Brazilian felt like a calamity which might undermine two seasons of rebuilding. Until then, Klopp planned to lead his side to the next level by accommodating Coutinho, Salah, Sadio Mane, and Roberto Firmino in the same line-up.

That is how it remained until January 2018, the so-called ‘Fab Four’ making Klopp’s Liverpool one of the most destructive forces in Europe. Coutinho was excelling as the advanced midfielder alongside two of either Jordan Henderson, Gini Wijnaldum or James Milner.

After Coutinho’s sale, there was anticipation that Klopp would sign a like-for-like replacement. He nearly did.

Had Nabil Fekir not suffered a knee injury for Lyon and instead sailed through a Liverpool medical in 2018, he would most likely have taken the No10 jersey and absorbed funds Liverpool redirected to sign goalkeeper Alisson Becker from Roma. Sliding doors moments.

Likewise, had Naby Keita hit the ground running he would have been a different profile of midfielder than those who have most regularly excelled in the last two years. Keita may still come good, but it has been a long wait. The standards of those thriving during his regular absences through injury have made his limited contribution more tolerable.

Whatever the permutations, few anticipated that the trio of Henderson, Wijnaldum and Milner would be so prominent in a side on the verge of adding the Premier League to the Champions League.

Fabinho’s arrival from Monaco in 2018 was also fundamental to that, and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain was showing encouraging signs of recapturing form before lockdown having undergone a year of rehabilitation after a knee injury.

But generally, whenever assessing how Liverpool can strengthen, discussion focusses on creative output and goal contributions from whoever fills the three midfield positions.

There is no hiding how, from an attacking perspective, the midfield numbers can improve. The six recognised central midfielders have 13 goals and nine assists in a combined 121 Premier League games in 2019-20.

That seems like a curious anomaly, but as the title has edged closer, there has been less emphasis on what those players lack and more on what they bring.

Here is the difference: when Coutinho was at Liverpool, Klopp’s side had four main attackers. Since his sale, Liverpool’s attack consists of a front five.

Liverpool’s midfield trio have freed Trent Alexander-Arnold and Robertson to spend so much time in the opposition half that they generally resemble old-fashioned wingers, or at the least are described more as wing-backs than full-backs.

They push on in the knowledge one of their midfielders will cover the space behind. That is why Alexander-Arnold and Robertson are responsible for 19 Premier League assists this season, 10 more than the six midfielders combined. The wing-backs might have been equally as productive had Coutinho stayed, but a defensive midfielder short, Liverpool’s centre-backs may not have been enthusiastic about being left exposed.

The appreciation of Liverpool’s midfield trio has risen because flaws in the system are more obvious without their discipline and diligence. Such qualities can too often sound like damning with faint praise. No more.

When Klopp tweaked his midfield away to Genk in the Champions League earlier this season, sacrificing one of his more pragmatic and defensively alert middle-men made Liverpool look more vulnerable, albeit they still won comfortably 4-1.

Liverpool could not play as they do without the physicality and alertness of their midfield three.

Obviously this collective evolution was intentional, Klopp sign-posting his plan to make Liverpool a more tactically aware and defensively sound side long before they became such.

Whether he anticipated the precise make-up of personnel who have executed it so perfectly is another matter. How can any manager foresee what personalities will be at his disposable four or five years ahead? It speaks volumes about the application of his players, the standards of coaching and Klopp’s ability to adapt to all circumstances - whether that is missing out on initial targets or dealing with the loss of his midfield playmaker - that it is now difficult to imagine it could have been achieved any other way.