Yahoo News Post Office scandal latest: Fujitsu data was 'manipulated', inquiry hears - watch live
Data extracted by Fujitsu before being presented to the Post Office was “manipulated from its original source”, the public inquiry into the Horizon scandal has heard.
John Simpkins, a Fujitsu employee working in its software support centre, told the inquiry that ARQ data, which recorded keystrokes made on Horizon by sub-postmasters, was provided to the Post Office in a “filtered” format.
When asked by inquiry counsel Jason Beer whether he was aware that data was presented to the Post Office in such a way, Mr Simpkins said he wasn’t.
“So the data has been manipulated from its original source into a filtered format. Correct? Was that something you were aware of? At the time?”
Mr Simpkins replied: “Not really. Because if we requested data for audit, which I believe we did, we got it back in the basic raw form.”
He also told the inquiry that the Post Office did not have access to a log maintained by Fujitsu employees which recorded bugs and that he “did not know” whether the organisation knew that it existed.
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03:44 PM GMT
Goodbye
We are ending our live coverage here as Gerald Barnes continues to give evidence to the Post Office inquiry.
Two Fujitsu employees, Mr Barnes, a software developer, and John Simpkins, a team leader within Fujitsu Software Support Centre, have addressed the inquiry.
In his evidence, Mr Simpkins told how Fujitsu staff became concerned at being “dragged” into criminal prosecutions of sub-postmasters after realising data presented to the Post office was “manipulated from its original source”.
Keep checking the Telegraph website for the latest stories on the Post Office scandal including reaction and a full report on the evidence heard today.
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03:36 PM GMT
Gerald Barnes - Sub-postmasters should have been informed of errors
Mr Barnes has told the Post Office inquiry that he believes sub-postmasters should have been informed of software errors as and when they occurred.
He said: “They should consider the possibility of some system call failing, ‘What do we do if that happens?’...The obvious thing is to send a message to the postmaster that an error has happened please contact the helpdesk.”
In January 2008, Mr Barnes suggested a fix was needed to correct an error that affected sub-postmasters when they balanced their accounts at around 7pm.
But his request was turned down because the problems were deemed to be a “rarity”.
In a note dated January 10, 2008, Dave Seddon from the Fujitsu Software Support Centre wrote: “It has been decided that no fix will be carried out for the time being given the rarity of the problem. Should the problem become more prevalent then the need for a fix will be reviewed once again.”
03:05 PM GMT
'Error handling could have been much better'
Mr Barnes then added: “So the error handling wasn’t as good as it could have been if designed properly from the start, but that’s not to say that the evidence wasn’t there to spot the problem after the event, because we get information in the windows event log et cetera.
“So what I’m saying is the error handling in an ideal world could have been done much better.”
When asked if his former colleagues shared his views, Mr Barnes said: “Well, the people I talked to didn’t seem to think that way.
“For example one colleague said: ‘Well you got to assume all of this fundamental stuff works, you’ve just got to assume that’,” he said.
He then suggested another colleague had said that “error handling” would be handled “later”.
Mr Barnes added: “So the two colleagues I informally mentioned this to didn’t seem to share my views to be honest.”
03:04 PM GMT
Gerald Barnes - Colleagues didn't share my views on handling errors
Mr Barnes is shown notes he made describing the software’s EPoS (electronic point of sale) code as not being “resilient to errors”.
He also told the inquiry that the system’s error handling was “not as good as it could have been”.
However he said former colleagues “did not share his views”, with one saying that “had to assume...fundamental stuff works”.
Notes on the January 2008 document written by Mr Barnes read: “The fact that the EPOS code is not resilient to errors is endemic.
“There seems little point fixing it in this one particular case because there will be many others to catch you out.”
When asked by Emma Price which errors EPoS was not resilient to, Mr Barnes said: “We just spotted cases where the error handling was not as good as it could have been, which we tried to eliminate over the years.”
02:15 PM GMT
Gerard Barnes sworn into Post Office inquiry
Gerald Barnes, a software developer with Fujitsu, has been sworn into the Post Office inquiry and is now giving evidence.
He will be questioned by Emma Price.
01:44 PM GMT
John Simpkins finishes giving evidence
We’re running a bit behind here but just to confirm John Simpkins has finished giving evidence and the inquiry has adjourned for lunch.
Fujitsu software developer Gerald Barnes will be sworn in after 2pm.
01:42 PM GMT
John Simpkins - Response to remote access query was 'wrong'
John Simpkins said he believed a response given to forensic accountants Second Sight about remote access was “wrong”.
Mr Beer KC began asking Mr Simpkins about the controversial topic of accessing data without a sub-postmaster’s knowledge this afternoon.
As part of his line of questioning, Mr Simpkins was shown a document in which an answer was formulated for a question posed by Second Sight, which was: “Can Post Office or Fujitsu edit transaction data without the knowledge of the postmaster?”
A formulated answer was then presented: “Neither the Post Office nor Fujitsu can edit transaction data without the knowledge of the sub-postmaster.”
After Mr Simpkins initially appeared to dodge the question of whether this was accurate, Mr Beer KC said: “So just answer my questions, in summary, ‘neither Post Office nor Fujitsu can edit transaction data without the knowledge of a sub-postmaster’, is wrong isn’t it?
“I believe so,” Mr Simpkins said.
12:49 PM GMT
Explained: What are PEAKs? And what is Riposte?
Gareth Corfield, The Telegraph’s Transport Correspondent and former Senior Technology Reporter, explains some of the technical terms discussed during Mr Simpkins’ evidence.
The inquiry has been hearing in depth about PEAKs. These are internal bug reports from Fujitsu. Each PEAK had a unique reference number.
For example, PEAK 0195561 was created on March 2 2010, when a sub-postmaster reported that Horizon crashed while he was trying to transfer £4,000 between accounting units within the system.
Riposte was a software suite used in local Post Office branches for day-to-day operations, such as selling stamps over the counter. It was used in the early 2000s as an interface between branch office EPOS terminals and the Horizon system.
Mr Justice Fraser, as he then was, described Riposte’s role in a 2019 High Court judgment: “Riposte provided the facility for reliable replication of data between the branches and the back-office or data centres/campuses.
“This means that if certain types of data were created at the branches, Riposte should have ensured that the same data would be available at the [Post Office’s central] data centres.”
Riposte is made by Escher Group, a separate company from either Fujitsu or the Post Office.
12:42 PM GMT
Fujitsu didn't want to be 'dragged' into criminal prosecutions of sub-postmasters, inquiry hears
Mr Simpkins has said Fujitsu stopped filtering data for the Post Office some time after January 2011 partly because it wanted to avoid being involved in criminal prosecutions, the inquiry has heard.
Jason Beer KC is questioning Mr Simpkins over why Fujitsu “downed tools” in relation to filtering ARQ data from Post Office branches.
The inquiry previously heard the data showing keystrokes from sub-postmasters was extracted and presented to the Post Office but following concerns from software developers the practice ended after January 2011 when emails showed requests to improve “functionality”.
When asked by Mr Beer if the decision to end filtering was as a result of wanting to avoid being “dragged or become involved” in criminal prosecutions or that it was too difficult a process to carry out, Mr Simpkins said it was “a partial both” but that it made sense to provide the Post Office with the full events instead of filtered data.
12:18 PM GMT
'Unmanageable' requests to check Post Office counters were working
The inquiry has been shown an email sent by the head of Post Office application support at Fujitsu describing how staff were finding requests to check data verifying whether branch counters were working properly was “unmanageable”.
An email sent by Steve Parker to Mr Simpkins and Anne Chambers in May 2010 said: “John, Anne, The event lists we are being asked to check on HNGX ARQ requests are just unmanageable (7-10,000 rows in the SYSMAN3 details).”
When questioned on the email, Mr Simpkins said Fujitsu’s security team would ask he and colleagues to look at data to see if a counter was “working properly”.
Jason Beer KC asked if this was to see whether “there was anything in the data which might contain a relevant event, an occurrence” that impacted on the “integrity or reliability of the data”.
Mr Simpkins said: “Of the operation, I would say yes.
“So we would get a large excel spreadsheet - here saying 7-10,000 events on it - and [be] asked to filter those to see if any could have an impact on the counter’s operation. It was a lot of data, it took a lot of time.”
Mr Simpkins then explained how he and colleagues would cross reference events with KELs as part of the process.
The resulting data was then sent back to the Post Office, the inquiry heard
11:34 AM GMT
John Simpkins - I only knew of Fujitsu litigation team yesterday
Mr Simpkins has admitted he only knew of a branch within Fujitsu dedicated to supporting litigation, including the potential assistance in Post Office prosecutions, on Tuesday.
The inquiry heard from Rajbinder Sangha, a former member of Fujitsu’s fraud and litigation support office, on Tuesday. She told how she was sent draft statements which said the Horizon system was operating properly “at all material times”.
Jason Beer KC said: “Were you aware of a branch within Fujitsu called litigation support?”
Mr Simpkins said: “From yesterday, yes.”
Mr Beer said: “You only learned yesterday?”
“Correct,” Mr Simpkins said.
11:16 AM GMT
Explained: What is ARQ and KEL?
Gareth Corfield, The Telegraph’s Transport Correspondent and former Senior Technology Reporter, sets out some of the more technical terms discussed during Mr Simpkins’ evidence.
Mr Simpkins’ evidence is deeply technical. As a software support engineer he was dealing with bug reports, which are complaints from sub-postmasters and others at the Post Office that Horizon wasn’t working correctly.
Internally at Fujitsu, problems with Horizon were collected in the Known Error Log, or KEL.
Resolving Horizon problems often meant Post Office managers asked Fujitsu for an ARQ, which stands for Audit Record Query.
ARQs are a record of keystrokes and transactions made on Horizon terminals, letting engineers trace what sub-postmasters did on computers at their branch offices.
Thanks to bugs in Horizon, however, these ARQs sometimes contained duplicated data, making it harder to trace exactly what went wrong in a particular case.
Sub-postmasters at branch offices could not raise ARQs themselves. Only Post Office managers had permission to do so.
11:12 AM GMT
John Simpkins - I didn't know Horizon data was used in prosecutions
Mr Simpkins has told the inquiry that he did not know Horizon data was used for criminal prosecutions until 2006 - seven years into the rollout and when many sub-postmasters had already been accused of theft.
Asked by Jason Beer KC when he became aware that this was the case, Mr Simpkins said it was only when Anne Chambers - a former senior Fujitsu engineer - was asked to provide evidence for a case.
Mr Beer said: “So that was about 2006”, to which Mr Simpkins replied, “Yes.”
Mr Beer then asked if “before then, i.e from rollout until door” Mr Simpkins understood the data was being used to investigate criminality of sub-postmasters.
“I don’t believe so,” Mr Simpkins said.
10:59 AM GMT
Post Office did not have access to Fujitsu records
Mr Simpkins has told the inquiry that the Post Office did not have access to a log maintained by Fujitsu employees which recorded bugs and that he “did not know” whether the organisation knew that it existed.
When asked whether in 2005 the Known Error Log (KEL) would be a good place to start in identifying whether a bug had occured before, Mr Simpkins agreed.
However, he said the KEL was maintained “reasonably” well.
He said: “I would say reasonably. I wouldn’t say perfect, I would say reasonably.”
Lead counsel for the inquiry Jason Beer KC asked if the Post Office had access to KEL, to which Mr Simpkins said: “No.”
Mr Beer then asked if the PO knew of the existence of KEL.
Mr Simpkins said: “I don’t know. I imagine we probably did refer to them quite often when we talked about an incident we would refer to a KEL reference.”
10:52 AM GMT
Fujitsu data given provided to Post Office was 'manipulated from original source'
Mr Simpkins is being questioned on how data was extracted by Fujitsu before it was presented to the Post Office.
The ARQ data, which has been described as a complete record of all keystrokes made on Horizon by sub-postmasters, was presented in a “filtered format”, the inquiry has been told.
Jason Beer, KC, counsel to the inquiry asked: “Did you understand that audit data, ARQ data, was extracted by Fujitsu and presented to the Post Office, it was presented in a filtered format?”
Fujitsu witness John Simpkins, formerly a team leader in the company’s software support centre, answered: “Yes, I’ve seen some ARQ extracts that look like they are filtered, and then put in Excel.”
Mr Beer continued: “So the data has been manipulated from its original source into a filtered format. Correct? Was that something you were aware of? At the time?”
Mr Simpkins replied: “Not really. Because if we requested data for audit, which I believe we did, we got it back in the basic raw form.”
Asked by Jason Beer KC whether that meant the data was “manipulated from its original source”, Mr Simpkins said it was.
10:33 AM GMT
Software expert explains Horizon rollout
The opening exchanges have featured very technical discussions on the software used at the time Horizon was rolled out.
Mr Simpkins has told the inquiry that there were “definitely problems” with the electronic point of scale (ePOS) part of the software at the beginning of the rollout, but suggested it was because it was a “new system”.
Mr Simpkins said: “There were problems with ePOS definitely. It was a new system. I don’t recall there being that many, mainly because of the amount of staff the SSC had.”
He said staff weren’t “overrun with defects” and that as the number of staff in the software support centre grew, the “defects were spread out”.
“Again we weren’t overrun. However, during rollout itself there were a lot more calls than post-rollout,” he said.
Questioned by counsel Jason Beer KC, Mr Simpkins has outlined his career history. After graduating from the University of Birmingham with a degree in software engineering, he began as a product developer at ICL Fujitsu before moving to a support role,
We will stay tuned and bring you the key developments as and when they emerge.
10:06 AM GMT
Post Office inquiry resumes
The Post Office inquiry has resumed with John Simpkins sworn in before giving evidence.
Mr Simpkins is listed as a team leader within Fujitsu Software Support Centre. His evidence will be followed by Gerald Barnes, a software developer, who raised concerns back in 2010 about “duplicate transaction” issues.
Today's hearings will begin at 1000. Follow the proceedings via our YouTube channel 👇 https://t.co/AelCQ2QWkH #PostOfficeInquiry
— Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (@PostOffInquiry) January 17, 2024
09:55 AM GMT
Sir Mark Rowley - Criminal investigation will take at least two years
As we await for the inquiry to start, we have a news line from Sir Mark Rowley, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who said a national investigation into potential criminal offences linked to the Post Office scandal will take at least until 2026.
Speaking to LBC, Sir Mark said: “We’re now working with police forces across the country to pull together what will have to be a national investigation, which we’ll pull together because there’s hundreds of postmasters and mistresses from across the country.
“Fujitsu are based in one part of the country and the Post Office is another part of the country, (it’s a) massive piece of work to do. There are tens of millions of documents to be worked through in a criminal investigation.
“And of course, we’ve got to do that following on behind the public inquiry, which I think finishes at the end of this year but won’t publish until late next year.”
09:45 AM GMT
Fujitsu employee raised concerns in 2010
Gerald Barnes, who is giving evidence on Wednesday, recorded his concerns with “duplicate transaction” issues and the potential for it to impact “high-profile” court cases, the inquiry heard on Tuesday.
Logging his concerns in November 2010, Gerald Barnes said: “The fast ARQ (audit request queries) interface does not provide the user with any indication of duplicate records/messages. This omission means that we are unaware of the presence of duplicate transactions.
“In the event that duplicates are retrieved and returned to (the Post Office) without our knowledge, the integrity of the data provided comes into question.
“The customer, and indeed the defence and the court, would assume that the duplicates were bona fide transactions and this would be incorrect.
“There are a number of high-profile court cases in the pipeline and it is imperative that we provide sound, accurate records.”
09:40 AM GMT
What happened at the Post Office inquiry on Tuesday?
Data from the scandal-hit Horizon system is still used in court proceedings, a Fujitsu employee told a public inquiry.
Rajbinder Sangha was asked on Tuesday whether the controversial system is still used to provide data used for prosecutions.
“Yes, I think it is,” said Ms Sangha, who is a former member of Horizon maker Fujitsu’s Fraud and Litigation Support Office.
Read more here: Post Office data from faulty Horizon software still being used in court
09:37 AM GMT
What did Fujitsu say on Tuesday?
Paul Patterson, Fujitsu’s European director, told a parliamentary select committee the firm has a “moral obligation” to compensate victims of the Post Office scandal.
Appearing before MPs on the Business and Trade Committee, Mr Patterson said he was “truly sorry” for the role the Japanese firm’s Horizon software played in the wrongful prosecution of more than 900 sub-postmasters.
He added his own “gut feeling” was that Fujitsu staff knew of glitches that meant shortfalls were falsely recorded in Post Office accounts.
Fujitsu’s global chief executive, Takahito Tokita, also apologised in his first public remarks about the scandal.
Read more here: Fujitsu boss admits ‘moral obligation’ to compensate Horizon victims
09:34 AM GMT
Good morning
The Telegraph will be providing live updates from the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry on Wednesday as two software specialists from Fujitsu give evidence.
John Simpkins, a team leader within Fujitsu Software Support Centre, and Gerald Barnes are likely to be asked about what they knew about glitches in the system after the company’s European director, Paul Patterson, said staff were aware of errors.
Their appearance comes after Mr Patterson apologised for Fujitsu’s role in the “appalling miscarriage of justice” which saw hundreds of sub-postmasters wrongfully prosecuted over supposed accounting errors.
We will bring you a live stream from 10am.
